On the 20th August 2009, Afghans went to the polls for only the second time to vote for a President. After the relative success of the first election in 2004, hopes were high that this round would enshrine democratic ideals in the Afghan people, with more NATO peacekeepers being in the country than ever before to help provide a stable voting environment. The widespread allegations of fraud have severely damaged these ambitions and places renewed strain on Afghanistan’s allies in the West, with many people arguing that the situation in Afghanistan is not even salvageable.

The truth is that it depends upon what you mean by ‘salvageable’. It is certainly still possible to build a stable, pro-Western Afghanistan, but, it will require several things that are difficult to attain. The first and most important can only be delivered by the Afghan political establishment itself – that being a Unity Government composed of the anti-Taleban elements within the country which have become increasingly factionalised since the 2001 invasion. It would be essential that the two principal opponents of the Presidential election, incumbent Hamid Karzai and former Foreign Minister Dr Abdullah Abdullah, have dominant roles within this government. This would help restore the legitimacy of the Afghan government as well as engender confidence that various corrupt practices would be minimised in the future, thanks to political opponents being able to monitor one another. This would also mitigate the divisions that are becoming a significant obstacle to progress and thus allow the government to become more inclusive.

The fate of Afghanistan will not just be decided by decisions made in Kabul, however: if the political reformation of Afghanistan is to be successful, it will require a massive and sustained commitment by Afghanistan’s western allies. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), established by the United Nations and led by NATO, consists of some 64,500 troops. US President Barack Obama had pledged an additional 17,000 soldiers in February 2009, in an attempt to refocus ‘the War on Terror’ away from Iraq.

Gordon Brown recently announced his intention to send another 1,000 soldiers to the country. It is hoped that this will bolster efforts to fight the Taleban and simultaneously help to rebuild civilian infrastructure and the training of the Afghan National Army. These additional resources go a long way to helping ISAF regain the initiative but these commitments will need to be long-term in order to be effective.  The question is- how realistic is this in light of the recent elections?

The US mission in Afghanistan has been thrown into confusion recently, with reports indicating that President Obama is now reluctant to grant a formal request to US General Stanley McChrystal (leader of the ISAF force) for an increase in troop numbers. This can, in part, be blamed on partisan Democratic lawmakers that were never especially supportive of what is seen as one of the ‘Republican’ wars of George W. Bush. They are now being placed under increased pressure by an American public weary of the stream of US casualties coming out of Afghanistan. This mood had become hardened in the wake of the August elections, with many Americans now believing their soldiers are dying in the defence of a government tainted by corruption, and unable to command the loyalty of the Afghan population in its fight against terrorism. President Karzai, accused by opponents of rigging the election, was once seen as a friendly like-minded US ally, only too happy to appear on CNN and US talk shows – now, he is suspected of taking advantage of US ambitions in the region.

Great Britain is still committed to sending the additional 1000 troops as planned although they may renege if President Obama officially declines the troop request. The situation is not helped by General McChrystal’s own assessment in a report to the President, where he said that “resources will not win the war, but under-resourcing could lose it.” The inference being that even if President Obama goes against the wishes of his party and the wishes of the American people and dispatches the requested troops, giving General McChrystal all the resources he believes he needs, the war still might be lost.

So, the future for Afghanistan is bleak. Factionalism plagues Afghanistan domestically, with corruption and vote-rigging merely adding to the distrust among the various politicians in Kabul. The foreign forces necessary to win might not be available for the short-term, let alone the long-term period necessary to affect real change. In such a situation, the only rational course of action is to set a timetable for a phased withdrawal – unless all parties are willing to take the drastic steps discussed, the ISAF presence is merely delaying defeat, not ensuring victory.

However, the suggested steps should at least be attempted - the war in Afghanistan, after all, is worth fighting. Not just in the moral sense regarding the US and UK’s obligation to better the lives of a people they invaded eight years ago, but also in a geopolitical sense. The United States and its allies have a lot to gain by ensuring the pro-American regime in Kabul is not replaced by the sort of regime that fostered the 9/11 attackers. So the question is not whether the fight is ‘worth it’, but rather, whether the United States is willing to defend and support, with lives as well as material resources, a leader who has turned out as the antithesis of the photogenic embodiment of all-American values that President Karzai first appeared to be in 2001.